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In a little more than three decades, South Korea has 
emerged as the world’s fi fth-largest nuclear energy pro-
ducer and, more recently, a signifi cant nuclear power 
plant exporter. This development has been driven by 
concerted government action as well as South Korea’s 
particular economic circumstances as a rising economic 
power lacking signifi cant fossil fuel reserves. In the com-
ing years, South Korea plans to increase further its reli-
ance on this low-carbon source of power as Seoul seeks 
continued economic growth without increasing carbon 
emissions. Nuclear power has brought important benefi ts 
to South Korea but also one particularly negative conse-
quence: an accumulation of spent nuclear fuel that will 
soon outstrip the country’s storage capacity for highly 
radioactive waste.
The lack of storage capacity results primarily from do-
mestic politics. To be sure, South Korea is not alone in 
this respect: public opposition to nuclear waste disposal 
has meant that only one country (Finland) is on track to 
open a permanent repository for the most dangerous nu-
clear waste. However, public opposition to nuclear waste 
disposal sites in South Korea has been more vociferous 
and long-standing than in many other countries, leading 
on one occasion to rioting. This has led Seoul to regular-
ly unveil and then scrap proposed new sites for disposing 
of this material and to reach a compromise earlier this 
decade on disposing of lower-level wastes that may have 
made even more intractable the problem of permanent 
disposal of high-level wastes.
Seoul’s dilemma has been exacerbated by some factors 
unique to South Korea. Korea’s tight population density 
makes it far more diffi cult to build a single large perma-
nent underground repository for nuclear waste, compli-
cating Seoul’s political challenge. South Korea’s location 
next to nuclear-armed North Korea and its status as a major 
U.S. ally and longtime partner with Washington in nuclear de-
velopment have also constrained South Korea’s choices when 
it comes to disposing of nuclear fuel. Ever since the United 
States pressured South Korea to shut down an incipient South 
Korean program aimed at producing plutonium in the 1970s, 
the United States has used both legal restrictions embedded in 
nuclear cooperation agreements and political pressure to ensure 
that Seoul does not follow that path again. In particular, Wash-
ington has concentrated on ensuring that South Korea does not 
separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel—a process that can 
be used to provide both additional fuel for nuclear plants and 
fi ssile material for nuclear weapons. Other countries such as 
France and Japan have used that process, commonly known as 
“reprocessing,” to delay the day of reckoning when it comes to 
high-level nuclear waste. Washington, at times, has also sought 
to involve Seoul in regional and multilateral efforts to build 
spent-fuel repositories but has yet to meet with success.
The current nuclear cooperation agreement between South Ko-
rea and the United States is set to expire in 2014. Only a few 
years later, South Korean scientists predict, the spent-fuel pools 
at South Korea’s nuclear plants will begin to reach capacity.1
The urgent need for South Korea to fi nd somewhere to put its 
surplus spent fuel means that Seoul is seeking to use the talks 
to relax some of Washington’s long-standing restrictions on the 
separation of spent fuel. In particular, Seoul is trying to win 
Washington’s blessing for constructing new facilities to test the 
economic and technical feasibility of utilizing a new form of 
reprocessing, known as pyroprocessing. Seoul contends that 
the process, originally conceived in the United States, does not 
produce a product suitable for nuclear weapons and should not 
be restricted in a manner akin to traditional reprocessing. In 
particular, Seoul argues that it should not even be considered 
reprocessing because South Korea does not plan to separate 
pure plutonium from spent fuel, as is done in traditional re-
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processing; instead, it plans to leave it mixed with other 
transuranic elements. But the U.S. government has yet 
to give its blessing. The United States worries that the 
process could be altered to produce a less benign prod-
uct, that it will be too diffi cult to institute safeguards to 
prevent such changes, and that any relaxation of its rules 
would harm its global and regional nonproliferation ef-
forts.
Current Nuclear Energy Production and 
Nuclear Waste Accumulation in South Korea
Korea utilizes 20 nuclear reactors, which generated 144.3 
terawatt hours of electricity in 2008, a little more than 
one-third of the country’s total electricity production. 
South Korea’s nuclear energy production only slightly 
trails that of Russia although its output still falls consid-
erably behind that of the United States, France, and Ja-
pan, the world leaders.2
According to the 2008 National Energy Basic Plan, how-
ever, South Korea plans to increase nuclear energy’s 
share of electricity generation to 59 percent by 2030, and 
the government plans to build approximately 18 more 
nuclear reactors.3
Yet, by the end of 2008, the existing reactors alone had 
already generated 10,083 tons of spent fuel and were 
adding 700 tons more each year.4 By the end of the cen-
tury (assuming the new planned reactors come on line), 
the cumulative amount of spent fuel produced by South 
Korean reactors is expected to exceed 110,000 tons. To 
dispose of such a large amount of spent fuel at a single 
site, an underground repository (and an exclusion zone 
surrounding the site) would need to cover as much as 
80 square kilometers, an area considerably larger than 
Manhattan. Finding that much free space in South Korea 
would be enormously diffi cult. The country is approxi-
mately the size of Virginia and is home to about six times 
as many people.
The Domestic Politics of Spent Fuel in South 
Korea
Seoul has been trying to tackle the issue of spent-fuel 
disposal almost from the moment its fi rst nuclear plant 
began operating in 1978. Because of the perception that 
Seoul would not have to decide on the ultimate means of 
dealing with spent fuel or high-level nuclear waste for 
decades, Seoul’s early measures were aimed at fi nding a 
site for disposing of low- and intermediate-level nuclear 
wastes (LILW) and an interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel located away from reactor sites.5 The early 
decisions not to construct interim storage facilities at re-
actor sites (such as had been done in countries like Ger-
many) refl ected both historical circumstances and politi-
cal judgments. When Seoul made these decisions in the 
mid-1980s, dry cask storage technology, which would 
prove so useful in Germany and is easier to manage at 
reactor sites, had not been widely adopted; instead, liq-
uid pools were seen as the model. Seoul decided that, if 
spent-fuel rods were to continue to be housed in water 
pools after they had cooled, it would make more sense to 
locate them all in a single facility. Likewise, Seoul cal-
culated that it would be easier to decommission nuclear 
plants and clean up the sites when they were no longer 
functional if no interim spent-fuel storage sites were lo-
cated at the facilities.
Seoul made these decisions without a great deal of public 
input, and subsequent attempts to locate a site for these 
facilities repeatedly foundered amid public opposition. 
During 1986–89, for example, the Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI) conducted a broad geologi-
cal study and picked what it saw as the top three poten-
tial sites for LILW and interim storage of spent nuclear 
fuel; these were on Korea’s southeastern coast and were 
supposed to begin operation by 1995 (for LILW) and 
1997 (for spent nuclear fuel). But in 1989, this effort was 
stopped by opposition from local residents living near 
the potential sites.
One year later, the government tried again, with plans 
to locate these facilities on Anmyeon Island, west of 
the mainland, and it sweetened the pot by proposing to 
construct a second headquarters for KAERI there. But 
a riot broke out when the plan was leaked to the press, 
the government again scrubbed the plan, and the minis-
ter responsible for the radioactive waste project resigned. 
Efforts to shift tack in 1991 and 1994 and seek public 
bids for the sites also fell through. Finally, another effort 
for a LILW facility proved fruitless: the government had 
planned to locate the site on the tiny, uninhabited Gulup 
Island, 90 kilometers southwest of Incheon harbor, but it 
suspended the plans after an active fault was found near 
the island.
In 1996, the government decided to split responsibilities 
for dealing with nuclear waste. It charged the electrical 
utility, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), with 
fi nding a site for LILW and an interim spent-fuel stor-
age facility (in 2001 this responsibility was transferred 
to Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power [KHNP]). KAERI, 
in turn, was assigned to focus on researching technology 
for ultimate disposition of spent fuel, with the ultimate 
decisions put off to a later date. The change, however, 
did not convince communities to house the facilities. 
Therefore, in 2005, the government took a new approach 
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that helped it to secure a two-square-kilometer site for 
LILW in Gyeongju, a city in the southeastern part of the 
country. The new approach, however, involved not tack-
ling the most dangerous waste and providing a number 
of sweeteners to the host community. A new law pledged 
that no additional spent-fuel storage facilities would be 
located in the host area, and it included a number of ad-
ditional incentives:
Providing a one-time $300 million contribu-• 
tion along with additional contributions of 
$600 per waste drum accepted (with a total 
potential cost of nearly $500 million if the 
site reaches full capacity),6
Relocating KHNP headquarters to the same • 
community,
Locating a proton accelerator and related • 
research and development facilities in the 
area, and
Promising additional long-term federal sup-• 
port to the area.
With these concessions in hand, Seoul was able to be-
gin construction of the facility in 2007. It is estimated to 
cost $1.5 billion at its initial capacity of 100,000 drums 
and considerably more if it reaches its full capacity of 
800,000 drums. South Korea’s leaders worried about the 
potential cost if they were to use a similar process to fi nd 
a fi nal disposal site for more highly radioactive material 
(which would require 30–40 times more space), and they 
have sought other alternatives.
In its December 2008 long-term research and devel-
opment plan, the Korea Atomic Energy Commission 
(KAEC), the country’s top nuclear policymaking body, 
which is chaired by the prime minister, called for in-
vestigating the possibility of using pyroprocessing to 
treat spent nuclear fuel, with the resulting product to be 
burned in new fast-burner reactors. It called for the con-
struction of a demonstration pyroprocessing facility and 
fast-burner reactor by 2028 in order to test this proposed 
system’s economic and technical viability.
Moving forward with these facilities would effectively 
require Seoul to convince the Obama administration to 
alter, to Seoul’s benefi t, its views on pyroprocessing and 
reprocessing, something that the U.S. administration has 
been quite reluctant to do for political, diplomatic, and 
historical reasons.
U.S.-ROK Tensions over Spent Fuel
U.S.-ROK cooperation in the civil nuclear fi eld is gov-
erned by the 1974 Agreement Concerning Civil Uses of 
Nuclear Energy, which expires in 2014.7 Insofar as spent 
nuclear fuel is concerned, the provision that is most rele-
vant in that agreement is Article VIII (F), which provides 
that, with respect to reprocessing or “alteration in form or 
content” of U.S.-obligated spent fuel, “such reprocessing 
or alteration” shall be performed in facilities acceptable 
to both parties upon a joint determination of the parties 
that the provisions in Article XI (dealing with the appli-
cation of International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 
safeguards) may be effectively applied. Thus, its legal 
emphasis is on the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect 
whether material from the civil nuclear program could 
be diverted to weapons, rather than trying to forestall this 
possibility altogether.
By contrast, the new agreement will be negotiated against 
the background of the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Act (NNPA), which amended the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946 pursuant to which the 1974 agreement had 
been concluded. The NNPA established new criteria for 
nuclear exports, including a provision on “subsequent ar-
rangements” covering a range of activities. The NNPA 
requires that any new nuclear cooperation agreements 
condition the supply of U.S. nuclear material on the will-
ingness of the recipient country to agree that it will have 
to obtain prior consent from the United States for any 
“alteration in form or content.” It also broadens U.S. con-
sent rights to cover not only nuclear material supplied by 
the United States, but also nuclear material that has been 
irradiated in a U.S.-supplied reactor. Agreements with 
non-nuclear-weapons states that adhere to the NNPA are 
subject to a congressional process that is biased toward 
approval: after Congress receives such an agreement, 
lawmakers must pass legislation opposing it within 90 
legislative days for it to be blocked. Although the United 
States has sought to have South Korea sign a new co-
operation agreement adhering to the NNPA terms, Seoul 
has refused to do so, preferring to wait until the current 
one expires.
Instead, South Korea in the new negotiations is seeking 
advance, long-term U.S. consent to pyroprocess or even 
reprocess U.S. fuel and use the fuel in fast reactors, a 
right the United States has so far granted only to Japan 
and Euratom several decades ago and to Switzerland and 
India recently. Such a deal would likely be seen as falling 
short of the NNPA’s requirements and would thus face 
far tougher requirements for congressional approval. Un-
der this circumstance, the administration would have to 
convince majorities in both the House and Senate to ap-
prove the change. South Korean offi cials have sought to 
dodge this issue in part by arguing that, given the differ-
ences between pyroprocessing and traditional reprocess-
ing, South Korean technology should not be subject to 
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the same limitations; but it is unlikely this argument will 
sway lawmakers or nonproliferation advocates.
Throughout the life of the current agreement, South Ko-
rea has shown a consistent interest in reprocessing al-
though its motivations and the type of technology it has 
pursued have changed over time.
South Korea’s interest in reprocessing was fi rst stimu-
lated by views then popular in the global community that 
the world would soon see the emergence of a nuclear en-
ergy economy anchored on plutonium breeder reactors, 
which, of course, would require reprocessing capabil-
ity. In the early 1970s, South Korea sought to purchase 
this technology, eventually reaching agreement to buy a 
small-scale reprocessing plant from France. This initial 
effort was halted, however, after the 1974 Indian “peace-
ful” nuclear test prompted the United States to turn 
against the spread of reprocessing technologies and after 
revelations that the then military government of Korea 
was planning to develop nuclear weapons or, at least, 
acquire the technology and capability to do so on short 
notice. Park Chung-hee, then Korea’s president, backed 
away from the effort after the United States threatened to 
withdraw its security guarantee to South Korea if Seoul 
did not halt its weapons development plans.8
A second stimulant related to national security was the 
concern that with the end of the Vietnam War the United 
States would—and in fact announced its intention to—
draw down its military presence in South Korea not-
withstanding the divided status of the Korean peninsula 
and continuing tension between North and South Korea. 
The announcement by President Jimmy Carter in the 
late 1970s that the United States intended to withdraw 
all ground troops from the peninsula by the early 1980s 
reinforced Korean security concerns, leading Seoul to re-
new its efforts to acquire a reprocessing capability from 
France—an effort thwarted by Carter’s personal inter-
vention with the French prime minister and his nearly si-
multaneous decision to halt the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from the Korean peninsula.9
As noted earlier, Seoul’s current primary incentive to ac-
quire a reprocessing capability relates to the spent-fuel 
management challenge facing the Korean government—
a challenge with near-term and longer-term implica-
tions—for which pyroprocessing is seen as a suitable 
option from the point of view of Seoul, but less so by 
Washington.
A consideration that may play a larger role in the future 
is the emergence of South Korea as a nuclear exporter. 
South Korea has just beaten out leading U.S. and French 
nuclear-exporting fi rms to win its fi rst major nuclear ex-
port agreement—a $20 billion deal to export four nuclear 
reactors to the United Arab Emirates—and South Korea 
aims to capture 20 percent of the world market for nucle-
ar reactors by 2030. It has also clinched a smaller deal to 
supply a research reactor to Jordan. Entry into the inter-
national market could provide a justifi cation for seeking 
to develop and offer full fuel cycle services.
All the while, the United States, a major partner of South 
Korea in many respects, including peaceful nuclear de-
velopment, has generally not supported—in fact, has 
sought to impede—South Korea’s engagement in pro-
liferation-prone nuclear fuel cycle activity, primarily, at 
this stage, reprocessing.
Washington’s approach refl ects the fact that, since In-
dia’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear test, the United States has 
grown increasingly concerned about nuclear prolifera-
tion and has attempted to prevent the spread of enrich-
ment and reprocessing technologies to new countries, not 
just South Korea. But it also refl ects particular concerns 
about the Korean peninsula, which led Washington to 
block the sale of reprocessing technology to South Ko-
rea in the late 1970s and, more recently, to engage with 
Seoul and Pyongyang in six-party talks aimed at ending 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
In 1992, under pressure from Washington, South Korea 
signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula with North Korea. South and 
North Korea agreed “not to test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; 
to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; and 
not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and ura-
nium enrichment.” North Korea has clearly violated the 
agreement by operating nuclear reprocessing facilities 
and producing and testing nuclear weapons; yet, to date, 
South Korea has been reluctant to renounce the agree-
ment altogether, hoping that North Korea can be lured 
back into eliminating its nuclear weapons and nuclear 
weapons program. The United States has strongly sup-
ported this position, with U.S. offi cials believing that, if 
South Korea were to openly break with the agreement 
by constructing its own nuclear reprocessing facilities, it 
might provide a pretext for Pyongyang to claim that its 
behavior was no more illegitimate than that of its south-
ern neighbor.
To be sure, Washington has been far from consistent in 
how it treats the issue of pyroprocessing both in the Unit-
ed States and in South Korea. From the very beginning, 
the George W. Bush administration saw pyroprocess-
ing as a potential solution to spent-fuel problems in the 
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United States and as less dangerous than conventional 
reprocessing. Indeed, the 2001 U.S. National Energy 
Plan defi ned pyroprocessing as “spent-fuel conditioning, 
not reprocessing.”10 This also led the U.S. government 
in the Bush administration to take a less critical view of 
South Korean pyroprocessing. It allowed South Korea to 
move ahead with building a laboratory-scale advanced 
conditioning processing facility to research pyroprocess-
ing technology on its territory, but it allowed South Ko-
rean scientists to use only natural uranium, rather than 
irradiated fuel, in the facility. The United States has also 
allowed South Korean researchers to conduct on a case-
by-case basis some experiments with irradiated material 
at U.S. laboratories. And the two countries have been 
working with the IAEA on demonstrating that the tech-
nology can be effectively safeguarded. South Korea was 
also assured that the administration’s Global Nuclear En-
ergy Partnership (GNEP) would not impact U.S.-South 
Korean cooperation on pyroprocessing.
A subsequent draft nonproliferation impact assessment 
of potential GNEP alternatives preliminarily concluded, 
however, that pyroprocessing was not signifi cantly bet-
ter from a nonproliferation point of view than tradition-
al reprocessing when it came to limiting the ability of 
countries to develop nuclear weapons.11 And the Obama 
administration does not appear inclined to expand exist-
ing U.S.-ROK cooperation to the extent that South Korea 
wants—that is, permitting Seoul to build an engineering-
scale facility that uses “hot” material. In part, this re-
fl ects the fact that the Obama administration appears to 
be shifting course on its own approach to dealing with 
spent fuel, putting less emphasis in the near term on ad-
vanced reprocessing techniques, such as pyroprocessing, 
and more emphasis on interim storage of spent fuel.
In addition to shifting bilateral dynamics, U.S. credibility 
in pressing Seoul on reprocessing or pyroprocessing has 
been undermined by the Bush administration’s decision 
to conclude a nuclear cooperation with India. That agree-
ment pledges that, pending subsequent negotiations, In-
dia, a state that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty (NPT), will be granted the right to reprocess 
U.S.-origin fuel for exclusively peaceful purposes for a 
future reprocessing facility as long as it is placed under 
effective IAEA safeguards. Given that agreement, Obama 
administration offi cials will certainly have diffi culty in 
arguing why such a right should be denied to a close ally 
that is a non-nuclear-weapons state party to the NPT.
Conclusion
When South Korea and the United States negotiated their 
last nuclear cooperation agreement in the early 1970s, the 
talks attracted little political attention or concern. Now, 
Seoul and Washington are gearing up to negotiate a new 
nuclear agreement within a radically changed economic, 
political and diplomatic context. Among other changes, 
South Korea now boasts one of the world’s largest and 
fastest growing nuclear power reactor fl eets and has be-
come a signifi cant nuclear exporter. 
To win U.S. support for a nuclear cooperation agreement, 
South Korea may have to be willing to take on new glob-
al nonproliferation commitments commensurate with its 
new role as a major global nuclear technology supplier, 
or in some cases be more public about doing so. In this 
context, Seoul can be expected to face particularly strong 
pressure from Congress not to proceed with the construc-
tion of a pyroprocessing test facility.12
More than three decades ago, the United States ended its 
own large-scale reprocessing efforts (based on an older 
technology) because it found the technology uneconomi-
cal and feared that it was providing a poor example to 
other countries. In dealing with domestic spent fuel, the 
Obama administration has indicated that it is inclined to 
rely on interim storage of U.S. spent fuel at reactor sites 
for the foreseeable future while looking at the possibil-
ity of centralized interim storage sites and conducting re-
search on long-term alternatives advanced reprocessing 
options such as pyroprocessing. Seoul is likely to face 
pressures from Washington to adopt the same approach. 13
Indeed, South Korean nuclear experts acknowledge that, 
with or without pyroprocessing, they will need to rely on 
interim storage for decades as they do not plan to build 
commercial-scale facilities for pyroprocessing until close 
to the middle of the 21st century. But they say that to win 
public acceptance they need to show that pyroprocessing 
or other long-term storage options are viable. Otherwise, 
local communities will not be convinced that any interim 
storage facilities will in fact be temporary.
The Obama administration is likely to insist that the new 
nuclear cooperation agreement conform to the terms of 
the 1978 NNPA and will not readily grant South Korea 
programmatic prior consent for reprocessing or pyropro-
cessing. Any other agreement would lead to substantial 
procedural and substantive problems in winning con-
gressional approval for the pact.
It is clear that South Korea faces a signifi cant problem 
in dealing with its spent nuclear fuel problem. Locating 
politically acceptable spent-fuel storage sites on Korean 
territory is a major challenge. Seeking to address the 
problem through supplier take-back of spent fuel, offi -
cials have found that regional or international alternatives 
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have not to this point proven to be a viable and reliable 
solution. Still, reprocessing, including pyroprocessing, 
poses its own economic, technical, diplomatic, and non-
proliferation challenges. Even the intuitively appealing 
notion of placing the facilities under some kind of mul-
tilateral structural or institutional arrangement—an ap-
proach some in Seoul are suggesting—will not serve to 
completely banish skepticism or challenges.
Nevertheless, given the close relationship between the 
United States and South Korea and both countries’ posi-
tions as leading nuclear energy producers and now ex-
porters, the negotiations over a new nuclear cooperation 
agreement provide an opportunity to infl uence the course 
that others will follow in making effective use of nucle-
ar energy without incurring increased risks of nuclear 
proliferation. Creative solutions are needed to address 
Seoul’s challenges regarding spent fuel without trigger-
ing Washington’s anxieties about proliferation.
Glossary of Terms
Dry cask storage—spent nuclear fuel stored in casks, 
surrounded by steel or concrete casings in order to shield 
workers and other personnel from the radiation that the 
fuel emits.  Dry cask storage is distinguished from wet 
storage, when spent fuel is kept in pools of water.
Fast burner reactor—A “fast” reactor is capable of pro-
ducing fi ssion in a wider range of materials than a con-
ventional reactor.  These reactors are capable of using the 
mix of fi ssionable materials generated by pyroprocessing 
as fuel.  A “burner” reactor produces less fi ssile mate-
rial through the nuclear reaction than it takes in as fuel. 
Burners can be contrasted with “breeder” reactors, which 
create more fi ssile material (in the form of plutonium) 
than they take in.
High-level waste—Highly radioactive materials created 
as a byproduct of the reactions that occur inside nuclear 
reactors. High-level waste includes spent nuclear fuel, 
and the waste products that are isolated from spent fuel 
by nuclear reprocessing.
Irradiated fuel—Nuclear fuel that has been used, or “ir-
radiated,” in a reactor.
Low-level waste—Objects or materials that have been 
contaminated with radiation or radioactive material.  
Natural uranium—Uranium as it is found in nature has 
a very low proportion of the fi ssile uranium-235 isotope 
and a very high proportion of uranium-238.  As such, it 
is not readily useable in many (though not all) U.S. and 
South Korean nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear fuel cycle—The progression of nuclear fuel 
through various stages, beginning with the mining of 
uranium ore.  Some other stages of the cycle include the 
enrichment of uranium to include a higher proportion of 
the fi ssile uranium-235 isotope, fabrication into fuel, and 
use in a nuclear reactor.  Following use in a reactor, the 
material becomes spent fuel, and may either be stored or 
reprocessed to fashion new fuel.
Plutonium—An artifi cially created fi ssile element that 
may be used to fuel a nuclear reactor or to form the core 
of a nuclear weapon.
Plutonium breeder reactor—A reactor that generates 
more fi ssile material, in the form of plutonium, than it 
consumes.
Pyroprocessing—A recently developed form of re-
processing that extracts uranium, plutonium, and other 
fi ssionable materials from the spent fuel in a mixture. 
Unlike traditional reprocessing, the plutonium is never 
intended to be separated from these materials.  
Reprocessing—The process by which spent nuclear fuel 
is broken down into some of its component materials and 
waste is separated from useful plutonium and uranium. 
The plutonium and uranium can then be refashioned into 
nuclear fuel and reused in a reactor.  Since some of these 
materials could also be used to create a nuclear weapon, 
reprocessing poses a proliferation risk.
Spent nuclear fuel—Fuel that has been used in a nuclear 
reactor and is no longer useful for generating a sustained 
nuclear reaction. Spent fuel typically contains a small 
percentage of uranium-235, a small percentage of pluto-
nium, a slightly larger percentage of highly radioactive 
“fi ssion products,” and a large percentage of uranium-238 
(which is not useful for generating a nuclear reaction in 
light water reactors, a common type of reactor). The plu-
tonium and uranium can be extracted through “repro-
cessing” and reused in a nuclear reactor or, potentially, 
in nuclear weapons.  
Transuranic element—An artifi cially made, radioactive 
element that has an atomic number higher than uranium 
in the periodic table of elements.  For example, pluto-
nium, neptunium, americium, and curium.
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